Arms Control the New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements

Therefore, Washington`s ultimate choice is not between a bilateral treaty that limits strategic nuclear forces and a trilateral treaty that limits all American, Chinese and Russian nuclear weapons; On the contrary, there are between bilateral borders for strategic nuclear forces and no borders at all. Similarly, Russia has no choice between a bilateral treaty that restricts strategic offensive and defensive forces and a treaty that limits only offensive forces, but between limiting offensive forces and no borders at all. Faced with this reality, both governments should focus on negotiating a new bilateral treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons. The attached CD-ROM reproduces the full texts of carefully selected extracts from treaties, conventions, protocols, guidelines, memoranda, memorandums, joint agreements, statutes, charters, binding decisions of international bodies, final acts of international conferences, exchanges of letters and diplomatic notes. Multilateral agreements are followed by a list of parties. Other technological developments – nuclear-powered cruise missiles, ALBM, airborne supercharged missiles (ALBGM) and SLGBM – are also relevant for a follow-up contract. These capabilities have or could have a strategic scope, but have never been limited by an arms control agreement. Prohibitions or restrictions on transactions could be useful in managing the associated risks. A compromise is possible.

The new art provision in a follow-up treaty should apply to both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons of strategic scope. However, their scope should be limited only to types of weapons created after negotiation and not to existing weapons that are not responsible because both parties have not agreed on whether they should be (otherwise a party could use this provision as a weapon and use it to achieve during implementation what it did not achieve during the negotiations). To further clarify the purpose of the provision and address U.S. concerns, Russia and the U.S. should negotiate a joint statement containing non-exhaustive lists of weapons that they would consider new types and not. (The lists would not necessarily be exhaustive, as it is impossible to predict a new type of weapon that could be used during the term of the contract. If a new type of weapon that is not listed in the agreed declaration were used, greater precision in the text of the treaty should significantly reduce the risk of disagreement over whether it should be held accountable.) Strategic arms control, using the example of New START, plays a particularly important role in risk reduction. (In unnecessary Cold War jargon, the term «strategic» is used to describe weapons with sufficient range to attack the other state`s country of origin from its deployment sites.) Because Russian and American strategic weapons – ICBM, SLBM and heavy bombers – directly pose an existential threat to the other nation, imbalances are particularly likely to catalyze an arms race. With a relatively large share of each state`s strategic forces and supporting infrastructure located in their home countries, the perceived threat of being attacked with strategic weapons is particularly vulnerable to escalation due to the instability of the crisis.

This approach would not alleviate U.S. concerns about Russia`s non-strategic nuclear weapons or China`s nuclear forces. Nor would it address Russia`s concerns about U.S. ballistic missile defenses. Instead, Moscow and Washington should try to address these concerns in other ways; If the treaty negotiations failed because their scope was too broad, the significant benefits of bilateral restrictions on strategic offensive forces would be undermined. However, the political outlook for a follow-up agreement is much less rosy than the technical outlook – although not entirely bleak. One of the challenges, particularly in the United States, is the domestic policy of ratifying treaties. A Republican president would probably have no trouble getting the two-thirds majority needed to get the advice and approval of the U.S.

Senate. A Democratic president would face a much more difficult challenge given the likely Republican opposition, but recent congressional support for the expansion of New START suggests there is continued bipartisan support for arms control. A well-conducted ratification campaign could use this support, although such a campaign is undoubtedly difficult. U.S. concerns about New START also extend to China`s non-participation and Russia`s large force of non-strategic nuclear weapons that are not responsible. These concerns are justified and important, but negotiating an agreement to limit strategic weapons is not the right forum to address them. China has made it clear that it will not engage in negotiations on a trilateral limitation treaty, and Washington cannot force it to do so. Beijing has pointed to the existence of a «huge gap» between U.S.

and Chinese nuclear arsenals, insisting that further U.S. cuts are needed to create «conditions» for multilateral disarmament negotiations.8 But perhaps the biggest challenge to a follow-up treaty is simply the dangerous state of U.S.-Russian relations — a «deep crisis,» as various Russian officials have said.30 Even in the nineteenth century, negotiating a strategic arms control agreement is difficult. In the current circumstances, when the standard assumption for each state is that the other is acting in bad faith and has to deal with emerging technologies that have never been regulated, negotiations would likely be particularly tense. The sharp decline in U.S.-Russian relations since New START went into effect has increased the risks of a quantitative arms race and the kind of deep crisis or conflict that could make them conceivable. As a result, the need for strategic arms control is greater today than at any time since the end of the Cold War. In fact, the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, passed with overwhelming bipartisan support, emphasizes that «legally binding and verifiable limits for Russia`s strategic nuclear forces are in the interest of U.S. national security.» 2 Goldblat, J. (2002). Arms control: the new guide to negotiations and agreements. SAGE Publications Ltd, intercontinental ground-based power-shifting missiles and nuclear-powered torpedoes. IGLBGMs and NTs represent new types of strategic offensive weapons.

For a follow-up treaty to be credible, it is just as important to limit these weapons as ICBMs or SLBMs. If IGLBGMs and NTs were not responsible, their use would allow the United States or Russia to circumvent the treaty`s limits. Russia and the United States are trying to solve this problem through the new START Bilateral Advisory Commission. However, even if they manage to find a mutually acceptable solution for the rest of New START`s lifespan, the problem is likely to resurface in negotiations for a follow-up contract (especially if one of the parties has to use conversion procedures to reduce SLBM launchers in order to achieve the contractually prescribed discounts). This controversy could probably have been avoided if the U.S. had taken the same approach it took when it converted all of the SLBM launchers of four Ohio-class SSBNs to cruise missile launchers. The U.S. reduced both the length and diameter of these pipes – a process that Russia admitted the pipes were clearly unable to launch SLBMs. This procedure, combined with increased transparency in the context of a monitoring contract, should become the standard for the conversion of SLBM launchers. 15. Restrictions on conventional arms and technology transfers A follow-up treaty should include a stricter provision that automatically requires new species to be held accountable, with negotiations being conducted only on implementation agreements.