(d) The German Government supports the issue of the limitation of naval armament of the system which divides warships into categories, fixes the maximum tonnage and/or armament of ships of each category and allocates the tonnage to be allocated to each Power by category of ship. Consequently, the German Government is prepared, in principle, and subject to point (f) below, to apply the 35%. To submit the tonnage ratio of each category of ships to be maintained and any modification of that ratio in one or more categories given to the relevant rules that may be laid down in a future general contract restricting maritime transport, such agreements being based on the principle that any increase in one category would be offset by a corresponding reduction in the other categories. If no general treaty on the restriction of the navy is to be concluded, or if the future general contract is not to contain provisions that create a limit by category, the manner and extent to which the German government has the right to vary the 35%. Relations in one or more categories will be settled amicably between the German Government and Her Majesty`s Government in the United Kingdom in the light of the maritime situation that existed at the time. The Anglo-German naval agreement was an attempt to improve relations between Germany and Britain. The Germans saw the deal as the beginning of an alliance against the Soviet Union and France. For Britain, however, this was to be the beginning of gun restrictions that would limit Germany`s expansion. This agreement was considered highly controversial by many other nations, as the tonnage quota gave Germany the power to produce a much larger navy than the Treaty of Versailles had allowed.
It was also carried out without prior consultations with Italy or France. This agreement did not affect future agreements between other maritime powers The talks continued on 5 June 1935 between Sir Robert Craigie, a naval expert in the British Foreign Office, and Admiral Karl-Georg Schuster, Member of Parliament for Ribbentrop. The Germans said the ratios would only be tonnage ratios and that Germany would increase its tonnage to the level of Britain`s tonnage in the various categories of warships. That afternoon the British Cabinet agreed to accept the proposed tonnage ratio, and that evening Ribbentrop was informed of the Cabinet`s intention. In the following weeks, the ongoing talks in London resolved many technical issues, most of which concerned exactly how to determine tonnage ratios for different categories of warships. In the area of German-English relations, the agreement was of great importance. The UK expressed hope, as shared by Craigie Ribbentrop, that it was «designed to facilitate other agreements in a broader framework, and there was no further thinking behind it». [3] In addition, the United Kingdom considered it a «benchmark» for measuring German intentions vis-à-vis the United Kingdom. [53] Hitler saw this as the beginning of an Anglo-German alliance and was very upset when it didn`t materialize.
[54] (a) The ratio of 35:100 will be a lasting relationship, i.e. the total tonnage of the German fleet will never exceed a percentage of 35% of the total tonnage of the naval forces, as contractually stipulated, of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations or, if there are no contractual restrictions on the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations in the future. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement (AGNA) of 18 June 1935 was a naval agreement between Great Britain and Germany that regulated the size of the Kriegsmarine in relation to the Royal Navy. The German navy was first and foremost an instrument for Germany to exert political pressure on Britain. Before the war, Germany would have been willing to cease or moderate its naval competition with Britain, but only in exchange for the promise of its neutrality in a European conflict. Hitler tried the same thing with different methods, but like other German politicians, he saw only one side of the picture. It is clear from his writings that he was extremely impressed by the role played by pre-war naval rivalry in creating bad relations between the two countries. Thus, he argued that the elimination of this rivalry was all that was necessary to achieve good relations. By gratuitously renouncing the absence of naval competition, he hoped that relations between the two countries would be improved to such an extent that Britain should not consider it necessary to interfere in German continental policy. Ribbentrop was very keen on success and eventually accepted almost all of Britain`s demands. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement was officially concluded on 18 June 1935 and signed by Ribbentrop and Sir Samuel Hoare. Hitler was very pleased with the agreement and called June 18, 1935 a great day, as he had the impression that the agreement was the beginning of a successful new Anglo-German alliance.
On May 22, 1935, the British cabinet voted to accept Hitler`s offers as soon as possible. The British ambassador to Germany, Sir Eric Phipps, advised them not to ignore the possibility of reaching an agreement with Hitler. British Admiral Chatfield also believed that the agreement should be seriously considered, regardless of France`s reaction. c) Germany will respect the ratio of 35:100 in all circumstances, e.B. the relationship is not affected by the construction of other powers. If the general balance of naval armaments, as usually maintained in the past, is violently disturbed by abnormal and extraordinary construction by other Powers, the German Government reserves the right to invite Her Majesty`s Government in the United Kingdom to examine the new situation thus created. On May 22, 1935, the British cabinet voted to officially accept Hitler`s May 21 offers as soon as possible. [36] Sir Eric Phipps, the British ambassador in Berlin, informed London that «because of myopia French,» no chance of a naval agreement with Germany should be lost. [36] Chatfield told cabinet that it was very unwise «to oppose [Hitler`s] offer, but what the Frenchman`s reactions to it will be is even more uncertain and his reaction to our own battleship replacement even more.» [36] Simon was not satisfied with Ribbentrop`s behaviour and stated that such statements were contrary to normal negotiation talks before leaving the negotiations. However, a few days later, on 5 June 1935, the British delegation changed its mind. Simon had discussed things with the British cabinet, which thought the deal might be in their best interest, and Simon had been ordered to accept Hitler`s offer while it was still on the table. They feared that Hitler would withdraw his offer and start building the German navy, which is much higher than the level they proposed.
Britain knew from history that Germany could quickly have the same naval capability as it could. ww2dbaseDirectly, this also helped the future Axis power Japan; With a potentially powerful German navy, the British must now maintain a strong presence in the North Atlantic and therefore be unable to meet the demand for a strong naval presence in their large Pacific colonies of Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. (b) If a future general treaty on the limitation of the sea does not apply the method of limitation through relations agreed between the fleets of different Powers, the German Government shall not insist on including the relationship referred to in the preceding paragraph in such a future general treaty, provided that the method chosen for the future limitation of naval arms is such that: that Germany has every guarantee that this relationship can be maintained. France and Italy formed a common front against Hitler`s unilateral rejection of the colony of Versailles, which also led to the bitterness of relations between Britain and France at a time when Anglo-French unity towards Germany was indispensable. Nevertheless, the agreement had a broader meaning: it was part of the extensive but ultimately futile efforts to achieve arms control at sea in the interwar period, and at the same time an important first step in Britain`s cowardly Nazi Germany policy, which became known as appeasement. .